Presence before powerChina's Arctic strategy in Icelandand GreenlandTies DamsClingendael ReportLouise van SchaikAdaja StoetmanJET新NAClingendaelNetherlands Institute of International RelationsClingendaelNetherlands Institute of International RelationsPresence before powerChina's Arctic strategy in Iceland and GreenlandTies DamsLouise van SchaikAdaja StoetmanClingendael ReportJune 2020Disclaimer:The research for and production of this report has been conducted withinthe PROGRESS research framework agreement.Responsibility for the contents and for theopinions expressed,rests solely with the authors and does not constitute,nor should beconstrued as,an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.June 2020Cover photo:China's research icebreaker Xuelong arrives at the roadstead off the Zhongshanstation in Antarctica,Dec.1,2018 Xinhua/Liu Shiping.Unauthorized use of any materials violates copyright,trademark and /or other laws.Should a userdownload material from the website or any other source related to the Netherlands Institute ofIntemational Relations 'Clingendael',or the Clingendael Institute,for personal or non-commercialuse,the user must retain all copyright,trademark or other similar notices contained in the originalmaterial or on any copies of this material.Material on the website of the Clingendael Institute may be reproduced or publicly displayed,distributed or used for any public and non-commercial purposes,but only by mentioning theClingendael Institute as its source.Permission is required to use the logo of the ClingendaelInstitute.This can be obtained by contacting the Communication desk of the Clingendael Institute(press @clingendael.org)The following web link activities are prohibited by the Clingendael Institute and may presenttrademark and copyright infringement issues:links that involve unauthorized use of our logoframing,inline links,or metatags,as well as hyperlinks or a form of link disguising the URL.About the authorsTies Dams is Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute.He is part of the EU Global AffairsUnit and the Clingendael China Centre.Louise van Schaik is Head of the EU Global Affairs Unit and a Senior Research Fellow at theClingendael Institute.Adaja Stoetman is Junior Researcher at the Security Unit of the Clingendael Institute.The Clingendael Institute2509 AB The HagueThe NetherlandsFollow us on social media@clingendaelorgThe Clingendael InstituteThe Clingendael Instituteclingendael_instituteEmail:info @clingendael.orgWebsite:www.clingendael.orgTable of contentsExecutive summary1Red flag:waking up to China in the Arctic2Presence before power:why China became a near-Arctic state62.1 Building presence:the long-term drivers behind China's engagement withthe Arctic72.2Chokepoints:the Arctic as part of China's maritime strategy92.3Geopolitics on ice:how China is shaping Russian and US Arctic policy2.4Conclusion:why China is in the Arctic193Iceland:what is China doing there and why?203.1 The presence of voids ()how China came to Iceland213.2 A Potemkin presence?A strategic perspective on China's presence in Iceland254Greenland:what is China doing there and why?294.1 The presence of voids (ll):how China came to Greenland304.2 A contested presence?A strategic perspective on China's presence inGreenland355The power of presence:engaging China in the Arctic385.1China's Arctic strategy385.2EU Arctic strategy405.3Dutch strategy41Executive summaryWhen,in 2018,the People's Republic of China published its first Arctic strategy,claimingthat the Middle Kingdom is a 'near-Arctic state,many a snigger could be heardthroughout the world of Arctic diplomacy.Yet,it is quickly becoming clear that Chinahas built a geostrategic presence in the Arctic that is not to be sniggered at.It is alreadyreshaping circumpolar politics in fundamental ways.Therefore,this Clingendael reportaims to answer the following questions:What are the long-term drivers behind China's growing presence in the Arctic?How is China currently shaping Arctic relations?How should Europe and the Netherlands engage with China's growing presencein the Arctic?Presence before power:what are the long-term drivers behind China's growingpresence in the Arctic?China's engagement with the Arctic was born as a geopolitical conundrum:in the midstof the Cold War the Arctic was seen as a vital part of China's security environment,over which it had no control.Following China's policy of opening up,China's Arcticengagement was further fuelled by commercial interests developed within the context ofits maritime strategy,and led to China playing an increasingly influential role in scientificexploration and Arctic governance.Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012,China's Arcticpolicy has adopted an explicit geopolitical purpose,within the context of China'sgeo-economic expansion,maritime ambitions and its changing relations with the USand Russia.China,in short,aims to build a significant geostrategic presence,not todominate the region,but to be able to translate that presence into power if and whenthe geopolitics of the Arctic heat up.The presence of voids:how is China currently shaping Arctic relations?Indeed,the geopolitics of the Arctic are already heating up.The stakes are long term,but high:to China,the Arctic is one of the arena's in which its fate as a superpowerwill be decided.China's focus on the Arctic lies first and foremost in the opening-upof the Northern Sea Route,which trails the Russian coast.Due to climate change,it is expected to be fully operational as a shipping route,meaning it will be ice-freethroughout the year by 2030.A fully operational Northern Sea Route (NSR)providesChina with a unique commercial and geostrategic opportunity,creating a major shippinghub between Asia and Europe free from US dominance.1